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Situation Model of Anticipated Response consequences in tactical decisions (SMART)
describes the interaction of top–down and bottom–up processes in skill acquisition and thus
the dynamic interaction of sensory and motor capacities in embodied cognition.The empir-
ically validated, extended, and revised SMART-ER can now predict when speciﬁc dynamic
interactions of top–down and bottom–up processes have a beneﬁcial or detrimental effect
on performance and learning depending on situational constraints.The model is empirically
supported and proposes learning strategies for when situation complexity varies or time
pressure is present. Experiments from expertise research in sports illustrate that neither
bottom–up nor top–down processes are bad or good per se but their effects depend on
personal and situational characteristics.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the soccer goalkeeper’s simple task of preventing a
penalty shooter scoring a goal. The goalkeeper’s behavior pro-
vides a good example of sensorimotor interaction, that is, the
interaction of sensory and motor capacities. Given the distance
of the ball to the goal (11 m or 12 yards), the mean speed of
a ball of more than 20 m/s (Farina et al., 2013), and a required
response of the goalkeeper of 100 ms or more before the actual
kick (Farina et al., 2013), the goalkeepermust quickly decidewhich
way to go. In simple terms, the goalkeeper’s options are to move
to the left, right, or middle. But how can one explain a speciﬁc
choice—say, a move to the left—and predict when the goal-
keeper will jump? The embodied cognition framework suggests
that this action is based on immediate and stored sensorimotor
experiences.
Sensorimotor interaction has long been described as a sequen-
tial and independent process throughwhich an organismperceives
a stimulus, cognitively processes that information, and then selects
a response (Proctor and Vu, 2006). In the last decades, however,
perception and action have been much more tightly linked, as
reﬂected, for instance, in the theory of common coding (Hom-
mel et al., 2001), which assumes that perception and action share
common processes and representations. The premise that actions
are coded in terms of their anticipated sensory consequences is a
principle as old as psychology itself (James, 1890). A goalkeeper
activating an action plan anticipates the sensory consequences of
a movement when jumping to one of the goal’s corners. Following
previous investigations by Beilock (2008) and Pizzera and Raab
(2012) developed new predictions about the interaction of sen-
sorimotor and cognitive processes. They suggested that stored
sensorimotor experiences can inﬂuence cognitive judgments. For
instance, umpires may judge observed movements better when
they rely on their own sensorimotor system, that is, when they
have experience with the movement they are being asked to
judge.
In this paper I present a model that describes top–
down and bottom–up processes of skill acquisition and their
interactions over time and explore how learning shapes the
use of these processes. This model follows other dual-
process models accentuating the importance of motor activity
(e.g., Strack and Deutsch, 2004) and common principles of intu-
itive and deliberative judgments (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer,
2011). A high level of cognitive control of sensory processing char-
acterizes top–down processes. In the penalty example, cognitive
control could use knowledge about, say, the shooter’s prefer-
ence to shoot to the left corner. Top–down processes are likely
to inﬂuence the gaze and the interpretation of sensory informa-
tion. Bottom–up processes are characterized by an absence of
cognitive control in sensory processing and use present infor-
mation more directly. In the penalty example, this could be the
position of the shooter relative to the ball (Savelsbergh et al.,
2010).
DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS IN EMBODIED COGNITION
There are at least four different ways top–down and bottom–up
processes interact over time (see Figure 1). Selective interac-
tion means following either top–down or bottom–up processes
(i.e., no interaction), so in the penalty example, the goalkeeper
would decide to jump to the left based only on knowledge of
the shooter’s preferred shooting direction, or the shooter would
decide to shoot to the left side independent of the goalkeeper’s
moves. This kind of pure selection seems unlikely from an embod-
ied account of cognition (Myachykov et al., 2013). In competitive
interaction both processes contribute but one process dominates.
For example, the goalkeeper would choose to use knowledge of
the shooter’s preference to shoot – from the perspective of the
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FIGURE 1 | Four types of interactions of top–down and bottom–up processes in embodied cognition.
shooter – left to decide to jump to his – from the perspective
of the goalkeeper – right corner. Consolidated interaction means
that both processes are involved in the choice. For example, if the
top–down process indicates jump left and the bottom–up process
indicates jump right, that choice conﬂict produces displacement
activity or frozen behavior (Troisi, 2002); if both processes point in
the same direction faster responses occur. Corrective interactions
describe sequential effects of processes. For example, the goal-
keeper may recall the shooter’s preferences and prepare an action
tendency toward that preference. However, when observing the
shooter approach the ball, the ultimate choice may depend more
on bottom–up processes that is for instance the position of the
foot relative to the ball. These interactions are dynamic and may
depend on previous experience on how success was experienced.
Therefore tactical decisions in skill acquisition are embodied
in the sensorimotor system and determine how situations are
perceived.
IMPLICITLY AND EXPLICITLY LEARNED SENSORIMOTOR INTERACTIONS
Expert athletes such as the goalkeeper in the penalty example are
often deﬁned as having 10 years and about 10,000 h of train-
ing that can inﬂuence their current choices at any moment in
time (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996). Therefore and to understand
the dynamics of sensorimotor interactions within an embodied
cognition framework interactions of cognitive and sensorimotor
processes need to be modeled with speciﬁc types of learning.
Learning is often differentiated as implicit and explicit; both types
are frequently cited in the motor and cognitive learning litera-
ture and researchers largely agree on the deﬁnition of the concepts
(Kleynen et al., 2014).
Implicit learning is deﬁned as a “non-intentional, automatic
acquisition of knowledge about structural relations between
objects or events” (Frensch, 1998, p. 76), and explicit learning as
an intentional acquisition that results in verbalizable knowledge
(O’Brien-Malone and Maybery, 1998). Looking at the learning
situation itself in terms of where it sits on the continuum of
intentionality may help identify implicit and explicit learning. Sit-
uations in which actions are incidental in nature engender implicit
learning, whereas situations in which actions are intentional in
nature engender explicit learning. In the penalty example, a player
learning soccer at the beach may differ from a player in an early
selection training group in which a coach and verbalized informa-
tion about options are available. The formermay have learned soc-
cer implicitly andwould refer to experienced bottom–up processes
more than the latter, who has acquired verbalizable knowledge and
may use top–down processes more in subsequent behavior. The
interactions of top–down and bottom–up processesmight fall into
the categories described above. People probably combine years of
implicit and explicit learning and thus experience hybrid learn-
ing (Mathews et al., 1989). It is unclear if hybrid learning leads
to better choices than those made by implicit or explicit learning
alone.
THE EXTENDED AND REVISED SMART: NOW SMART-ER
One model that explicitly predicts the effects of implicit and
explicit learning on anticipated response consequences of actions
is SMART, the Situation Model of Anticipated Response conse-
quences in tactical decisions (Raab, 2007), in which time-pressure
decisions in sports (e.g., a tactical choice of shooting or passing)
are explained as a function of the interaction of top–down and
bottom–up processes. In this model (see Figure 2), these processes
dynamically interact as described above but in addition, a repre-
sentation format, or equivalence class (Hoffmann et al., 2004), is
chosen. Equivalence classes are representations of sensorimotor
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FIGURE 2 | Situation Model of Anticipated Response-consequences
in tactical decisions—extended and revised (SMART-ER). Top of the
Figure Bottom–up (BU) and Top–down (TD) processes are displayed as
functions of experience represented in classes of equivalence (fe).
Learning is differentiated as Implicit (IL) and Explicit (EL) learning. β
represents weighting of implicit and explicit learning over time of
accumulated experience. Evidence (E) of a speciﬁc region (r) when
perceiving information in the environment is used in a choice rule, in
which the initial option in a speciﬁc region (k) is contrasted to later
evidence in other speciﬁc regions (r). Details for equations for weighting
top–down and bottom–up processes can be found in Glöckner et al.
(2012).
interactions of anticipated response consequences. An anticipated
response consequence describes a representation of the sensori-
motor system in which we predict future (anticipated) changes
in the environment as a consequence of our movements. Equiv-
alence classes are representations of sensorimotor interactions
active when anticipating response consequences that group the
consequences of speciﬁc choices together. Finally previous implic-
itly or explicitly learned behavior activates a choice rule that allows
one to accumulate information before choosing between certain
options (Glöckner et al., 2012).
Here I present an extended (E) and revised (R) SMART,
and thus it is labeled SMART-ER. An important extension is
the additional focus beyond the person on situations in which
dynamic situation-speciﬁc sensorimotor interactions take place.
Such situations are characterized by whether a ﬁxed set of
options are present, as has been used in most research to
validate SMART (Raab, 2007), or whether people generate dif-
ferent options themselves, as demonstrated in option-generation
paradigms (Johnson and Raab, 2003). SMART has also been
extended to include speciﬁc predictions based on the com-
plexity of a situation, which can be manifested in the num-
ber of choice options, the visual information available, and
the speed at which decision have to be made (Raab, 2003).
SMART has been revised to specify when implicit learning and
explicit learning—in contrast to hybrid learning—may be ben-
eﬁcial. SMART’s predictions of when implicit motor learning
is beneﬁcial have been revised to be valid in less complex sit-
uations in which the sensorimotor interactions do not require
attention regulation via top–down processes. In complex situa-
tions, explicit motor learning may be beneﬁcial because it uses
knowledge to attend to “information-rich” areas (Magill, 1998).
Finally, hybrid learning may be beneﬁcial in complex situations
because this type of learning allows the interaction of top–down
and bottom–up processes to be calibrated during learning. In
simple situations, in contrast, bottom–up processes could reg-
ulate the choice and top–down processes would interfere and
potentially deteriorate performance.
In the following sections I present empirical evidence support-
ing SMART-ER.Evidencehas been found in laboratory researchon
the complex movements involved in choices in team sports (Raab,
2003; Raab et al., 2005). In other work,manipulation of top–down
and bottom–up processes were tested by applying time-pressure,
reducing access to knowledge from long-term memory (Raab,
2003). Instruction manipulations have also been applied (Raab
and Masters, 2009). Measures of bottom–up processes include the
percentage of early ﬁxations to areas in which the ﬁnal choice is
present (Raab and Johnson, 2007), and for top–down processes
whether the ﬁrst option generated will be overruled if more time
for generation is given (Johnson and Raab, 2003). Response time
and gaze data have been used to predict participants’ ﬁrst and ﬁnal
choices and model predictions have been cross-validated to other
trials or samples (Glöckner et al., 2012).
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF TOP–DOWN AND BOTTOM–UP PROCESSES
Based on the tradition separating dual-processes (Chaiken and
Trope, 1999) and the above-cited speciﬁc models from Strack and
Deutsch (2004), Beilock (2008), and Kruglanski and Gigerenzer
(2011) my own work supports these notions using longitudinal
data. For instance, in a longitudinal study, expert team-handball
players were asked to identify the best option for a playmaker in
a video displaying attack situations. The task assessed (a) partic-
ipants’ ﬁrst choices, (b) alternative options participants deemed
appropriate, and (c) after all options were generated, the option
participants chose as the best one (Raab and Johnson, 2007). Deci-
sion time and gaze behavior, indicating ﬁxations on these options,
were measured. Experts abandoned their ﬁrst option in about
40% of cases and chose a different best option, possibly indicat-
ing a top–down inﬂuence, as the visual display did not change.
Bottom–up processes have been identiﬁed by early ﬁxations to
important options (Raab and Johnson, 2007).
EVIDENCE OF TOP–DOWN AND BOTTOM–UP PROCESS INTERACTIONS
In the above-described study (Raab and Johnson, 2007), system-
atic gaze behavior (e.g., ﬁxation on options on the left attack side)
becamemore strongly correlatedwith the generation strategy (e.g.,
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generating options on the left side) over the course of the study,
indicating consolidated interactions of top–down and bottom–up
processes. Measuring ﬁxations over time makes it possible to pre-
dict the weighting of early and late information. Results of a study
by Raab and Laborde (2011) showed best model ﬁts and cross-
validation of model predictions for two-thirds of the participants
when early information was weighted more than late informa-
tion (i.e., indicating less reliance on top–down processes). For the
remaining third of participants the pattern was reversed, and thus
individual differences in how much deliberation using top–down
processes is needed before a ﬁnal choice is made may explain these
patterns.
EVIDENCE OF SITUATION-SPECIFIC LEARNING EFFECTS
Situation Model of Anticipated Response consequences in tacti-
cal decisions – extended and revised predicts situation complexity
affects implicit and explicit as well as hybrid learning. Results from
four experiments with option-selection tasks in three different
sports indicate that indeed, implicit learning produces better and
faster choiceswhenmanipulating low complex situations (index of
complexity deﬁned by low number of options and low visual com-
plexity) and explicit learning in complex situations (Raab, 2003).
Implicit learners were found to have less verbalizable knowledge
that could have been used for top–down processes in contrast to
explicit learners. These experiments have been ecologically val-
idated in more realistic sports situations using different kinds
of instructions (Raab and Masters, 2009). Finally, hybrid learn-
ing, as predicted, has been found to outperform more implicit
or explicit learning only in complex situations, indicating a more
consolidated interaction of bottom–up and top–down processes
(Raab et al., 2005).
CONCLUSION
Situation Model of Anticipated Response consequences in tactical
decisions – extends and revises a previous situationmodel of antic-
ipated response consequences of tactical decisions. This extension
considers situation in a model of top–down and bottom–up
processes and therefore indicates when speciﬁc sensorimotor
interactions may occur and change behavior. Further, the model
reconsiders the beneﬁts of implicit, explicit, and hybrid learn-
ing strategies and how they may foster the use of top–down and
bottom–up processes. This model has been tested mainly on sen-
sorimotor interactions in quite complex situations, but further
evidence has been found in ﬁne motor control (Raab et al., 2013)
and neurophysiological correlates are yet to be further tested (Hill
and Raab, 2005). Future research should test the model’s predic-
tions in other domains and compare the model to others available
(Glöckner et al., 2012).
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